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HISTORIANS AND archaeologists ignore each other at their peril, but the peril is greater for the historian since concrete evidence which is at odds with a par-
ticular theory of historical development will simply not go away and eventually 
must be taken into consideration. In some areas of inquiry more than others, history and 
artifact must be at each other's service because neither alone can begin to suffice. Such is 
the case with the 300-year period in the area of the Red River delta and adjacent Thanh-
hoa Province in northern Viet-Nam, the cradle of the Vietnamese nation, between the 
middle of the third century B.C. and the revolt of the Trung Sisters in A.D. 40. It is a 
period which poses a number of highly interesting theoretical problems for the historian 
and philologist, and recent developments in archaeology have contradicted older biblio-
centric and sinocentric notions (the two often go hand in hand) to the extent that a 
thorough reexamination is in order. As a preliminary step in that direction, this article 
aims at outlining the sociohistorical situation of Viet-Nam when the first extensive im-
position of Chinese power on the area began. The object of the exercise is threefold: first, 
to point out what I believe are certain important historical implications of recent ar-
chaeological activity; second, to suggest a few notions of a theoretical nature which might 
address those historical implications; and third, to set the stage for a more extensive ex-
position at a later date of the development of Viet-Nam under Chinese hegemony from 
the first to the tenth centuries. 
I should like to indulge in a short digression before examining the specifics of the case. 
When dealing with the very early history of Southeast Asia and its links with outside 
civilizations, one is often led to wonder whether the term "Southeast Asian" has any in-
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tegral validity. In other words, is it not merely a modern conceit, the result of recent 
geographical and political convenience? Working in today's world, one must always be 
alert to the dangers of playing up to modern nationalisms and the desire to maintain ac-
cess to the sources of data which are controlled by those who do not share the scholar's 
concern for disinterested insight. If there is a qualitative reality which a term like 
"Southeast Asian" can usefully describe, however, then it merits serious consideration. It 
may turn out, for example, that there are features common to many of the early cultures of 
Southeast Asia that are sufficiently widespread and basic to allow us to speak about a 
Southeast Asian prehistory that can be meaningfully contrasted with, say, a northern nu-
clear Chinese prehistory in something more than obvious geographic locus. Without 
wishing to resurrect the theories of Ellsworth Huntington, I for one would still not be sur-
prised if the early cultures of Southeast Asia could be shown to share some significant 
common responses to the environmental peculiarities of their area, climate being one of 
the determining factors. To bring this point to bear specifically on the case at hand, it has 
always been assumed, at least by traditional Chinese scholars and those like myself who 
read what they wrote, that Chinese agricultural technology was introduced grosso modo 
into Viet-Nam and that the economic development of the latter was due to the skillful 
adaptation of those techniques by the local inhabitants under Chinese tutelage (cf. Mas-
pero 1918:9, Aurousseau 1923:244, Le 1955:87, and Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig 
1973:262, all of whom ultimately depend for their assertions on sources such as the Shih 
Chia and the Dai Viet Su Ky Toan Thub • The latter, although part of the Vietnamese his-
toriographic tradition, are mainly derivative when dealing with this period). Now it may 
eventually be possible to demonstrate that Chinese agricultural technology, born in the 
environment of China north of the Yangtse, moved south subsequent to changes in the 
climate of central and southern central China (a southward shift in the temperate zone af-
ter about 4000 B.C.) that rendered the more southerly environment increasingly suscepti-
ble to the application of that technology. But at the point where this investigation begins, 
the Chinese had yet to master the lands which lay between their secure northern domains 
and the Red River area, that is, the region now known as Kuang-tung and Kuang-hsi 
provinces. The question this leads to is: Did the Chinese encounter here andlor farther 
south populations whose cultural response to their environment was technologically infe-
rior to or less appropriate than that which the Chinese possessed, and was the Chinese ap-
proach substituted for the indigenous one? Or was there a preexisting Southeast Asian 
technology, developed in and appropriate to the tropical environment, which was taken 
up by the Chinese and applied, mutatis mutandis, within the scope of their colonialization 
(as Maspero 1918:9, n3 implies and Davidson 1976:93,96, n36 hints at)? 
Contact between the Middle Kingdom and the dominant culture occupying the Red 
River delta and environs, where some of the distant ancestors of the modern-day Vietna-
mese have lived in situ for generations untold, must have already been taking place by the 
late Chou dynasty (second half of the first millennium B.C.), if not before. In Viet-Nam, 
this epoch is primarily the haunt of the archaeologist, although there is a rudimentary 
description of it in traditional histories. In the absence of contemporaneous records, such 
traditional histories are often taxed with being legendary and, in any event, appear for the 
moment to have been transcribed much later. Happily, however, the corrections made by 
Nguyen Phuc Long (1975) to the work of Bezacier (1972) and a handy survey by David-
son (1976) of recent archaeological work have made the general outlines of what is known 
about this period available to those for whom the original Vietnamese sources are inac-
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cessible. The importance of the new findings is that they will enable us to appreciate 
much more clearly the state of the Red River civilization at the point in time at which it is 
impinged upon by Chinese political and military expansion. The old picture of a power-
ful, technologically advanced, and numerous Chinese force descending upon the Red 
River peoples, who are more or less swallowed whole, is not only misleading but partially 
inverted as well. We now have reason to believe that the Chinese encountered a stable, 
structured, productive, populous, and relatively sophisticated society of whose existence 
they had a knowledge, if not an appreciation, through intermediary sources of long 
standing. 
Here I should like to propose the use of a particular term in the rest of this discussion: 
"Proto-Vietnamese," or PVN. By PVN will be meant the group or groups of people in 
the Red River delta and its environs, stretching northward into southern Kuang-tung and 
Kuang-hsi and southward through coastal Thanh-hoa Province, a people who shared the 
material culture illustrated by the Dong-son and related finds, a people who were heirs in 
the second half of the first millennium B.C. to the cultures illustrated by the finds at Go-
bong, Dong-dau, and Go-mun, a people whose domain appears to have been congruent 
with the historical state ofVan-Langc • Though immigration to the area may have played a 
part in the earlier build-up of the population, by this time the inhabitants probably spoke 
one Austroasiatic language (Norman and Mei 1978:3-7, 23-24) or a variety of related dia-
lects and possessed a social hierarchy responsible for regional concerns, hydraulic works, 
and, to some extent, military defense. 
The salient facts which can be gleaned from a reading of Vietnamese archaeological 
work (and which the historian must retain) have to do with the technological level of the 
population. The economy of the PVN was based on wet riziculture. Use was made of 
draught animals, metal ploughshares, axes and other implements, as well as irrigation 
complexes of considerable size. Irrigated rice cultivation in the area dates back to the early 
second millennium B.C., if not earlier, and the regular use of metal tools, while perhaps 
somewhat later in its inception, was already long established before any significant 
historical intercourse took place between PVN and Chinese (Davidson 1976). In other 
words, none of these developments can be held any longer to have been the result of Chi-
nese occupation during the historical period; in this regard, the affirmations heretofore 
relied upon by historians and the authors of our standard textbooks will have to be 
seriously modified, if not dispensed with entirely (Maspero, Aurousseau, Le, Fairbank et 
al., and others cited earlier). 
One striking piece of evidence for the relatively advanced state of PVN activity in the 
third century B.C. is the citadel at Co-loa. Impressive as are its dimensions (the cir-
cumference of the outermost of its three ramparts is some 8 km), its real importance lies in 
the testimony that it bears to the ability of the PVN economy to produce the agricultural 
surplus and to release the manpower necessary for its accomplishment over a relatively 
short span of time. Reinforced with guard towers and defensive works, the walls attain a 
height of 3 to 4 m and are complemented by extensive moatlike ditches leading to the 
river Hoang that are apparently intended to facilitate coordination ofland and waterborne 
defenses. The use of kiln-fired bricks and tile in its construction, as well as considerable 
finds of metal weapons in the surroundings, can only reinforce the impression one gains 
of a people quite dissimilar to those whom the Chinese describe in their meridional con-
tacts, even allowing for the fact that Chinese ethnographic descriptions of the period are 
not noted for excessive charity. 
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I have alluded earlier to contact between the Chinese and the PVN through intermedi-
ary sources of long standing. These intermediaries were the Yiiehd , and before going fur-
ther into the subject of Chinese expansion into the Red River area, I should clarify to the 
extent possible to whom I refer, since the imprecision of the term has confused historical 
discussion from the very beginning. In fact, I am not convinced that the early Chinese 
commentators on the period were themselves entirely clear about the various groups of 
people they called the Hundred Yiiehe , who these people really were, how they were 
related, or where they were located, and this fact compounds our problems today. It 
would appear that, of whatever racial stock they were (and this is so far unresolved), by 
the fourth to third centuries B.C. the Yiieh were a broadly related set of tribes and nations 
who had spread out considerably from previous points of concentration in southern 
coastal China. One of the reasons for distinguishing among the several divisions of the 
Yiieh is the existence of a much higher degree of sinicization among those people in-
habiting the historical state of Yiieh, which is mentioned from the late Chou onward in 
the Chinese annals as the traditional rival of the state of Wuf • Heavily influenced by the 
thriving state of Ch'us, which was itselflong a center of sinicized, if not sinitic, southern 
culture, the state of Yiieh was located south of the Yangtse, in the area of modern Che-
kiang and Kiang-hsi provinces. Its inhabitants were accomplished sailors and were 
possibly responsible for some of the wide distribution of the bronze wares of the PVN 
through their control of the coastal trade. Serruys, in his impressive study of Han period 
dialectology (1959), accepts the dialect words representing Yiieh presented in the Fang 
Yenh as convincing evidence that there were a sufficient number of Chinese speakers 
among these northernmost Yiieh to constitute a separate Chinese dialect. But the term 
Yiieh, with various qualifiers, was applied to many other peoples in the realms farther 
south (thus the collective "Hundred Yiieh"), peoples who it is fair to assume were 
somehow related to the autochthons of the state ofYiieh but who did not share the latter's 
Chinese ways. 
The PVN, through cross mixture or some element of early common ancestry, were 
almost surely related genetically and/or culturally and/or linguistically to the various 
tribes to the north who were called Yiieh by the Chinese, as the appellation Yiieh (whence 
the syllable Viet in Vietnamese) has been linked to the names for some of the early consti-
tuent PVN tribes found in the indigenous and in the Chinese historical traditions. But the 
PVN were nonetheless distinct from those Yiieh peoples best known to the first Chinese 
sources, both in their locale and in the level of their material culture. 
The standard Chinese historical texts, when detailing the affairs of "China" south of 
the Yangtse at the time of the short-lived Ch'in dynasty (221-206 B.C.) and the early Han, 
describe a series of events which, in turn, misled early Vietnamese historians (and quite a 
few later ones, too). They reconstruct a situation in which the Red River area was brought 
under the direct control of the Ch'in and then of the secessionist Chinese-ruled kingdom 
of Nan-Yiieh i , centered near the modern city of Canton. This supposed Nan-Yiieh con-
trol over the PVN homeland led to the later acceptance of the ruling house of Nan-Yiieh 
by Vietnamese historians as a national dynasty (the so-called Trieu dynasty), proper suc-
cessors to the house of Thud, ruling from 207 to III B.C. (Dai Viet Su Ky Toan Thu: 
ngoai ky, q. 2, among others). However, contemporary descriptions of the territory of the 
kingdom bear little resemblance to what we now know of the Red River delta. The region 
these early sources depict is not only low and damp but unsalubrious, thick with forest, 
and unproductive, as well as overrun with snakes, not a place of fertile cultivation and 
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long-standing habitation on a large scale. The inhabitants are not numerous; the Han en-
voy Lii Chiak notes to the founder of the independent Nan-Yiieh state, Chao T'ol in the 
year 196 B.C.: 
Now the peoples of [Your Majesty, the] King are no more than a hundred thousand, 
barbarians all of them, squeezed between mountain and sea. (Shih Chi: ch. 97) 
As regards the defense capabilities of the Yiieh, a memorial to the Han throne in 135 B.C. 
holds that: 
The Yiieh are both weak and lacking in talent; they do not know how to fight as infan-
try, are ignorant of horse [-drawn] vehicles, and cannot use [cross-] bows. (Dai Viet Su 
Ky Toan Thu: ngoai ky, q. 2) 
The problem with a general description of this nature is that one does not know, in the 
absence of clear contextual reference points, to which part of the rather extended domains 
of Nan-Yiieh they refer, but I think a case can be made, particularly in view of the fact 
that the seat of the Nan-Yiieh government was located at P'an-yiim (that is modern Can-
ton), that the picture they paint applies rather well to the region later to become the prov-
inces of Kuang-tung and Kuang-hsi. The latter area was to remain inhospitable for many 
years to come, a situation I take up again below in connection with the famous census of 
the year A.D. 2. Suffice it to say that when one reads the commentaries of Chinese envoys 
and historians of the period, one cannot avoid the impression that the area with which 
they are best acquainted and most concerned was not the Red River delta or what later 
became Thanh-hoa Province. 
I therefore suggest for purposes of analysis, based on material considerations irrespec-
tive of the old Chinese appellations, that it would be useful to think of the Yiieh as being 
divided into three general categories, reading from north to south: the sinicized Yiieh of 
the sub-Yangtse region; the so-called Min Yiiehn ofFukien, and the relatively unadvanced 
Yiieh, known sometimes to Chinese historians as slash-and-burn agriculturalists and occa-
sional hunter-gatherers located in Kuang-tung/Kuang-hsi, who form the base population 
for the realm ofNan-Yiieh and who act as a kind of buffer between China proper and the 
Red River area; and finally the quite unsinicized Yiieh of advanced indigenous culture, 
living in an area centered on the Red River delta and Thanh-hoa (and perhaps slightly 
northward into southern Kuang-tung/Kuang-hsi), the same people I have chosen to call 
the Proto-Vietnamese. To use Sir Julian Huxley's zoological term, one might say that the 
Yiieh formed a "cline," with significant intraspecies variation from north to south. 
I should next like to outline briefly some of the better-known work that has been done 
on the major historical events from the Ch'in dynasty up to the beginning of the first cen-
tury A.D., relying on written sources, and examine it in the light of what we know about 
the PVN thanks to the diligence of the archaeologists, particularly our colleagues in Viet-
Nam itself. The period prior to 111 B.C. was studied in some detail by Aurousseau (1923), 
whose work has broadly influenced subsequent writing by others in Western language 
publications. Outstanding scholars such as Wang Gungwu, whose study of the Nan Hai 
trade (1958) has been seminal, Le Thanh Khoi, whose history (1955) is still required 
reading, and Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, whose East Asia: Tradition and Transfor-
mation (1973) is currently a standard text in introductory courses in many U.S. univer-
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sities, all reflect Aurousseau's assessment of Ch'in and Former Han activities in the area. 
Aurousseau's work is highly-almost deceptively-detailed and his conclusions have, on 
the whole, been treated with little skepticism insofar as his reconstruction of the Ch'in 
and Nan-Yiieh "conquests" are concerned. A close reading of this major article, however, 
reveals a substantial number of qualifying phrases ("on peut imaginer que ... " [po 177], 
"Si cette supposition etait fondee, on pourrait tracer ... " [po 177]; "11 faut penser 
que ... " [po 197], " ... il est vraisembable d'autre part que ... " [po 197], "11 semble 
donc que ... " [po 197], "11 est peu probable que ... " [po 197]) in nearly every instance 
before those very passages in which the author affirms the nature of the southward extent 
of Chinese domination prior to III B.C. Short of rehearsing his whole argument, 
Aurousseau can be said to maintain that the armies of the Ch'in, moving south through 
the "five passes" (which Aurousseau goes to some length to locate and with which I have, 
for the moment, no quarrel), subjugated the traditional homelands of the Yiieh peoples in 
their diverse variety, including the homeland of the Hsi (or Western) Ou-lo (or Tay Au-
lac)o, that is, the territory of the PVN in the Red River delta and Thanh-hoa. Aurousseau 
holds that the texts available on the period, particularly the Huai-nan TzuP, which is 
about the oldest extant, justify his view that, after overcoming logistical obstacles and a 
prolonged struggle with what can only be described as local guerrilla forces, the Ch'in ar-
mies took and occupied these areas, although he does concede that the Chinese allowed 
for the local authority of native rulers. Wang Gungwu (1958:10) is even more specific as 
to the administrative machinery set in place. In each of the commanderies supposed to 
have been instituted after the Ch'in military sweep of the south, he posits the existence of 
a "governor and a garrison commander" and the fact that "both of these functionaries had 
secretarial staff." Although there is little or no doubt that arrangements of this sort existed 
in the areas nearer to the former limits of the Chinese domains and in the territories adja-
cent to centers of Chinese settlement such as P'an-yii, I do not think that the evidence 
warrants that these assumptions be applied across the board and specifically not in the 
case of the Red River delta and environs. 
Given my reservations about this point, it would be profitable to reconsider the basis 
for Aurousseau's assertion that there was Ch'in occupation of the PVN homelands, that 
is, the Huai-nan Tzu (in all fairness, it must be added that Aurousseau's contention that 
the Ch'in administration was effectively in control of the Red River and Thanh-hoa areas 
rests on other texts as well, but those texts stand at a much greater temporal distance from 
the events, the strongest, for example, the Chiao-chou Wai-yu Chiq and the Kuang-chou 
Chi', dating at best half a millennium hence [Aurousseau 1923:209-217]). In fact, the 
Huai-nan Tzu is highly uninformative. And how Aurousseau and others have been able to 
make so much out of it for 10 these many years is something I fail to fathom. The Huai-
nan Tzu does not say the Ch'in occupied or even that they fought in the Red River region, 
much less that they went still further south. What it does say, and all it says of direct rele-
vance to the PVN, is that fhe soldiers of the Ch'in killed a "Lord of the Western Ou 
[named] I Hsii Sung" (a name which Karlgren 1940 would reconstruct as *djak xiwo song) 
in the course of making war on the Yiieh people following the construction of the Hsing-
an' canal (located in northernmost modern Kuang-hsi, close to the Hu-nan border; cf. 
Lapicque 1911 :426); 
The Superintendant Lu, having been sent by the Ch'in and yet having no means of 
assuring the transport of supplies, had the troops dig a canal and the grain was sent by 
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this route. Thus was it possible to make war on the people ofYiieh. I Hsii Sung, a Lord 
of the Western Ou was killed. The people ofYiieh took to the maquis and, living with 
the animals, none would consent to become the slaves of the Chinese. (Huai-nan Tzu: 
ch. 18, apud Aurousseau 1923: 172) 
A strict construction of this passage, particularly in view of the identity and location of 
the canal with which Aurousseau is in complete accord (1923:149fI), can only support 
that the Western Ou took part in the resistance to the Chinese along with unspecified 
groups ofYiieh (to whom, few scholars would abjure, the Western Ou were related). This 
does not mean that the battles took place in, or even near, the Red River and Thanh-hoa 
regions, nor that they finally resulted in the occupation of the same by the Ch'in. My own 
view, and it is largely supposition for the moment, is that the PVN participated in battles 
taking place in areas rendered immediately accessible by the Hsing-an canal, probably 
northern and eastern Kuang-hsi, and perhaps western Kuang-tung along the course of the 
rivers Kuei' and Hsi". Whether they were engaged in these actions as a result of the need 
for direct defense because members of their group lived in these areas alongside related 
Yiieh tribesmen or rather, as I think more likely, they were called on as allies of such 
Yiieh, the armies of the Ch'in apparently won the set battles and the remnants of the de-
feated troops proceeded to harass the victors to good effect for several years thereafter. But 
my own view notwithstanding, what this passage in the Huai-nan Tzu cannot do is to pro-
vide a steady foundation for Aurousseau's somewhat exuberant "11 s'agit donc bien du 
Tonkin ... " (1923: 176), given that the Western Ou are usually identified as early inhabi-
tants of the aforementioned region, much less "C'est une preuve solide en faveur de la 
these selon laquelle, les pays annamites furent pour premiere fois conquis par une expedi-
tion chinoise qui partit de Chine en 221 et furent, quelques annees plus tard, en 214, 
organises en commanderies chinoises" (1923: 176). If Wang Gungwu is basing himself on 
the same passage, or on Aurousseau's airy flights originating thence, then some of his 
scenario for Ch'in period "Tongking," which includes the ubiquitous activities of the 
Chinese tax collector (1958: 10), may require rethinking. This is because, in my opinion, 
the Chinese were not in "Tongking," either then or at any time in the following century, 
in any true administrative sense. Lest my affirmations on this point seem too direct, I 
should point out that Aurousseau's localization of the activities of the Ch'in also includes 
a contention that the commandery of HsiangV, established following the Ch'in victories, 
occupied the Red River region and extended down to below modern Binh-dinh (about 
13° N), and it is possible that Wang Gungwu found some merit in this theory as well. He 
was apparently unaware of Maspero's (1924) quite effective demolition of Aurousseau's 
work on Hsiang commandery, given his statement that "There is more or less agreement 
now that Tongking was the likely place for the capital [of Hsiang] ... " In point of fact, 
no one has ever effectively refuted Maspero's earlier (1916) placing of the commandery of 
Hsiang entirely within the confines of the southern border of modern China, although 
some Chinese map makers (e.g., Ch'eng and Hsii 1955:1, 13) may not know it. Nor, to 
judge from passages referring to the Red River delta's having been under "Chinese con-
trol ... near the end of the third century B.C.," do Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig 
(1973:262). Although Le Thanh Khoi may have been mistaken in accepting the Chinese 
introduction of the plow in the PVN areas (and may be forgiven for so doing, since the 
publication of the relevant archaeological finds postdate his work), he does not accept the 
Ch'in conquest of any place south of Nan-ning (1955:91-92). In sum, then, it can be said 
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that a proper reading of the texts of the period should not lead the historian to conclude 
that the Ch'in conquered the Red River delta and beyond. Although archaeological find-
ings can never be predicted with complete safety (hence the appeal of the sport), the evi-
dence published to date has not brought forth much if anything to support the thesis of 
Aurousseau but, rather, tends to confirm the idea that the PVN were largely autonomous 
from a cultural and material standpoint. For the moment, the best cases that can be made 
by the two disciplines dovetail. 
The Ch'in was a short-lived albeit important dynasty. As I mentioned earlier, one must 
also deal with the period of the secessionist state of Nan-Yiieh that came into being upon 
the fall of the Ch'in, in control precisely of those areas which the latter did conquer and 
hold in the next to last decade of the third century B.C. Since I have stated that the Ch'in 
did not achieve the conquest of the PVN heartlands, one might assume I will also main-
tain that, ifNan-Yiieh took over the areas offormer Ch'in hegemony, then Nan-Yiieh did 
not control the Red River delta and farther south. And that is indeed the case. Archaeo-
logically, we possess no more reason to assume Nan-Yiieh controlled the area in question 
than did Ch'in at any point between the end of the third century and III B.C., when Nan-
Yiieh fell to the legions of the Han. The texts and the exegeses thereof present a confusing 
picture of the period as regards the southern border regions of N an-Y iieh, and not the 
least of the confusion stems once again from the work of Aurousseau. Henri Maspero 
(1924:380) characterized the part of Aurousseau's article dealing with the geography of 
the commandery of Hsiang as "cet echafaudage ingenieux, mais quelque peu hasardeux 
d'hypotheses enchevetrees." I would add that his subsequent highly interdependent 
assumptions all trace back to his proposition that the Ch'in conquered the Red River delta 
and that this region was part of Hsiang. And, of course, many other writers have followed 
this trail Aurousseau blazed on into the desert. But here I must weaken the case for the 
prosecution to a degree, or at least not oppose a defense plea that Aurousseau's thesis con-
cerning the Nan-Yiieh period did not differ substantially from what was long held to be 
the case by traditional Vietnamese historians, that the events he describes, even if 
chronologically rearranged, were familiar and generally accepted. Perhaps so, but I also 
believe that they were essentially fictitious and, more importantly, misleading as to the 
nature ofPVN society before the real, later imposition offull Chinese power. 
The beginning of this period is fairlyclear: with the death ofCh'in Shih Huang-ti in 
210 B.C. and the accession of his weakling son, Erh Shih, the Ch'in empire, prey to inter-
nal dissent, started to crumble. In 207 B.C., General Chao T'o (or Trieu Da in Viet-
namese), Commandant ofLung-chuanw, the man who was responsible for earlier victories 
over the Yiieh and Hsi-ou guerrillas harassing the Ch'in forces and who was probably 
something of a military strongman in these parts, received from Jen Ao%, the dying 
Governor-General of the southernmost realms of the Ch'in, a mandate to assume from 
him the reigns of power and, in effect, to break away from the empire. Up to this time, it 
had been Ch'in policy to deport to this area thousands upon thousands of ethnic Chinese 
-criminals and malcontents, and possibly simply the poor. Chao T'o may have relied on 
these elements and seems to have also been fairly astute in his relations with the in-
digenous population, though I do not know of any reason to suppose, as does Wang 
Gungwu (1958:7), that he was halfYiieh himself. (If, as Wang believes, Chao T'o was 
born in the area at about 228 B.C., then he led the Ch'in armies at about the age of 10 and 
took command of Nan-Yiieh at 21. To believe the traditional date for his death of 137 
B.C., he would have lived 91 years. And if, as is more credible, he was somewhat older 
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when first made a general, then he would have had to have lived well past 100, all of 
which strains the imagination. Some of the dates must be in error somewhere and sur-
mises based on them are necessarily suspect.) The question which occupies us here, how-
ever, is what effect did Chao T'o's taking the reins of power in Nan-Yueh have on the 
PVN in the Red River delta? Aurousseau, perched atop his frail theoretical scaffolding, 
has no option but to keep climbing, and so tells us that the Ch'in domains in Tongking 
[sic], temporarily expropriated by a lord of the land of (Pa-) Shu (Le., the house of Thuc 
mentioned earlier), one An-duong VuongY, were brought back into the fold by feats of 
Chao T'o's arms and so remained under (secessionist) Chinese suzerainty. At this point, 
his narrative fits partially into the events as described by the Dai Viet Su Ky Toan Thu 
(ngoai ky, q. 1-2) and other traditional Vietnamese historiography. These works generally 
say that, in or about 257 B.C., An-duong Vuong came from Pa-Shu' (usually thought to be 
in Sze-chuan) and imposed his rule by force over the kingdom of Van-Lang (mentioned 
earlier in connection with the PVN), changing its name to Au-Lac··. He is traditionally 
thought to have been the builder of Co-loa and to have ruled until his defeat through ruse, 
magic, and treachery at the hands of Chao T'o~ Aurousseau differs in that, having decided 
that the Ch'in were masters of the Red River delta at a time well after 257 B.C., An-duong 
Vuong must have only arrived on the scene during the confusion at the fall of the Ch'in 
and have ruled for a couple of years, whereupon Chao T'o did him in. 
The story of An-duong Vuong is problematic, and the problem consists of deciding 
what in the story is possibly real and what part is myth, what part may tell us something 
of value about the PVN and their relations with their northern neighbors and what part is 
less significant detail. As far as Maspero is concerned, An-duong Vuong was the hero of a 
type oflegend found in other cultures as well as elsewhere in Vietnamese mythology, and 
he is used mainly to explain away the fortifications at Co-loa (1924:393-394); Aurous-
seau's use of him is capricious and pointless. It is a case where "la lI!gende avait remplace 
l'histoire" (1916:53). As T'eng Yuan-Ii (1967:28) has pointed out, there are some prob-
lems inherent in accepting the traditional view that An-duong Vuong was the son of the 
king of Shu, since the latter was brought under the power of the state ofCh'in in 316 B.C., 
well before Ch'in finished uniting China, making it somewhat difficult for An-duong 
Vuong to have lived over a century later. This does not, however, prevent T'eng from 
believing in the basic historicity of An-duong Vuong and, in fact, he seems to think it not 
unreasonable to suppose that our paladin was probably none other than the son of I Hsu 
Sung. All this appears to me to be like trying to reconstruct the skeleton of an extinct rep-
tile by piecing together the few bits that we can find, a hip bone, a jawbone, and the odd 
tooth or two-one risks coming up with an animal bent permanently into an unnatural 
posture. And our documents on An-duong Vuong are little better than scattered bones, all 
of which just goes to point out a salient fact about working in this period in general: tex-
tual exegesis is good fun and, as long as one is dealing with matters of a higher order like 
religion, it can be quite harmless. But when one is attempting to make a meaningful state-
ment about the grey area where prehistory meets up with earliest recorded history, it can 
no longer be regarded, in and ofitself, as a sound way to proceed. We need more. 
Here is where we wait for the archaeologist to come to the rescue. The question we 
would ask is: does one find evidence to suggest a material relationship between the finds 
in northern Viet-Nam and Sze-chuan? Is the relationship casual, peripheral, and inciden-
tal, or is it generic, basic, and coeval? What else is there that might serve to suggest a 
possible northwest-southeast axis of cultural intercourse? What come immediately to 
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mind are the objects unearthed at Shih-chai-shanab • Admittedly, the site is in Yiin-Nan, 
not Sze-chuan, but it is nonetheless northwest of the PVN homelands, and the degree of 
similarity with PVN finds is so striking as to lead some scholars to suggest very close links 
between the two (cf. Bunker 1974, von Dewall 1974). The significance of the story of An-
duong Vuong at this stage in our knowledge of the period is simply that it implies some 
connection between the PVN and peoples living to the northwest. If An-duong Vuong did 
exist, he may have come at a much earlier time, say, a century or two previous to the date 
traditionally ascribed to him. The one question of importance that can be addressed at 
present by our colleagues in Viet-Nam would be to obtain a fairly reliable dating for the 
structure at Co-loa. If, in the future, material similarities are found to exist between Co-
loa and sites to the northwest in China, then the question of the introduction of certain 
techniques from that direction will arise and the story of An-duong Vuong and his inva-
sion will surely come up again, since his is the only name associated with Co-loa in the 
historical tradition. And if the historical tradition was rooted in many generations of oral 
history among the PVN prior to its having been transcribed, then I believe one is justified 
in looking somewhat farther afield than Sze-chuan for the ancestral home of An-duong 
Vuong, because the fact of his having come from Shu is one of those details that could 
have easily been based on later considerations that might have arisen during the course of 
the story's transmission or on an understandable ignorance of geography among those en-
trusted with the tradition. The reasons for the importance of a reliable date for Co-loa, 
apart from pure historical curiosity, are, first, that if similar sites show up to the north-
west, we shall be able to say which came first and make some suggestions as to the 
primary direction of the flow of influence and, second, if we are ever to be able to clear up 
the question of the historicity of An-duong Vuong, it would be handy to have a date for 
Co-loa if only to be able to accept or reject a connection with what eventually turns up 
regarding him. 
As I have stated earlier, I see no reason to believe that at the time he establir.hed the 
kingdom ofNan-Yiieh, Chao T'o had any control over the Red River delta or parts south, 
although the PVN living there may have previously had to defend themselves against out-
lying Chinese military forces on the northernmost frontiers of their territory and thus may 
have had a healthy respect for Chinese arms. They were at all odds aware of Chao T'o's 
activities from traders and from refugees fleeing south. I think these latter people, always 
a tragic result of man's unending warfare, must have included some ethnic Chinese as 
well as the more obvious non-Chinese elements, since the Shui-ching Chuac (ch. 37) says 
that Chao T'o was quite ruthless in eliminating physically all those officials whose loyalty 
to him was questionable when he decided to secede. Chao T'o's relations with the Han 
throne, once the issue of Nan-Yiieh's recognition of Han suzerainty was resolved, were 
still not smooth. Fear and suspicion on both sides, notwithstanding the apparent success 
of the embassy of Lii Chia, were exacerbated by continual border clashes, principally at 
the expense of the inhabitants of the region ofCh'ang-sha. In about 183 B.C., the situation 
had deteriorated to the point of open warfare. A Han expedition sent south succumbed to 
the rigors of the Nan-Yiieh climate and what must have been a prodigious epidemic of 
malaria (which illustrates my contention that many Chinese at this time had difficulty in 
maintaining their health in the Nan-Yiieh region). Chao T'o, having triumphed in the 
event, decided to bestow the title "Emperor" upon himself. At the same time he made ef-
forts to require the lesser lords among his neighbors to acknowledge his suzerainty. The 
Shih Chi (ch. 113) and the Ch'ien Han Shuad (eh. 95) recount that Chao T'o, through gifts 
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and bribes, got the PVN lords to accept vassal status. We have no other direct testimony 
from the time. It can be said that, from Chao T'o's point of view, assuming suzerainty 
over the Red River region may have served to puff up his prestige vis-a-vis other powers, 
especially the Han. Aurousseau (1923:196-199) makes the point, however, and it is a rea-
sonable one, that one wouid have to suppose, as does Maspero (1916:53-54), that Chao 
T'o was able in effect to buy his way into a position of influence over the PVN lands 
where previously the Chinese could not triumph by force of arms. But perhaps this 
phenomenon is not inexplicable. If Aurousseau is right in his assertion that I Hsii Sung 
met his end at the hands of a Chinese army while leading PVN troops into battle (the 
possibility of this having occurred does not, as I point out earlier, require acceptance of 
his thesis that they fought in "Tongking"), then it seems to me to follow that the PVN 
were aware of Chinese military prowess and preferred to accept a nominal vassal status 
which would probably include increased trade and de facto autonomy rather than to go to 
war. In the more modern history ofViet-Nam, it has often suited the purposes of an in-
dependent Vietnamese monarchy to allow the Chinese throne to maintain the pretense 
that Viet-Nam was a vassal of China, as long as the latter made no attempt to enforce any-
thing other than the paying of a relatively light tribute. This did not stop the Vietnamese 
sovereigns from referring to themselves as Emperors (except in official correspondence 
with the Chinese throne), pursuing heterodox policies and customs, persecuting Chinese 
residents in Viet-Nam, or any other course of action that amused them. Just how long ago 
the Vietnamese or their predecessors realized that it was wiser to feed the Chinese dragon 
(as long as he did not get too hungry) rather than to bait him one cannot tell, but it is well 
within the bounds of probability that the lords of the Red River delta in the second cen-
tury B.C. were already aware of the relative advantages of this strategem. 
It is by the mid-second century B.C. that, almost all scholars agree, some form of 
nominal northern hegemony was installed over the lands of the PVN. From this point on, 
the Chinese refer to the Red River delta region as Chiao-chiha • and to the Thanh-hoa area 
as Chiu-chena" although it remains to be seen if the local inhabitants concurred with this 
nomenclature or if, indeed, they were entirely aware of it. There passed what, for the 
history books at least, was a period of some seventy uneventful years. Little if anything is 
recorded of direct relevance to Chiao-chih and Chiu-chen in the Chinese histories, and 
their Vietnamese counterparts and derivatives have, as I indicated previously, made the 
mistake of considering the history ofNan-Yiieh to be the history ofViet-Nam and thus re-
count the happenings at the court of P'an-yii and suchlike irrelevancies. All we know is 
that legates of the Nan-Yiieh throne were sent to the two PVN provinces and that they 
were most likely entrusted with census matters and receiving certain levies in kind. Given 
both standard Chinese practice in border regions and the obvious exigencies of their 
duties, it would be logical to presume that they were accompanied by some sort of armed 
retinue, although I would doubt that these troops could have been detached to Chiao-chih 
and Chiu-chen in numbers considerable enough to constitute a significant military threat 
to the power of the indigenous nobility. I would speculate that their sole responsibility, 
other than "showing the flag," was to protect the few Nan-Yiieh officials and such ethnic 
Chinese residents and traders as may have been found so far south. Emphasis should be 
placed on the small-scale nature of these operations in all their phases, because to the best 
of our knowledge no archaeological remnants have come to light which would support 
any assumption of large-scale Chinese-style occupation or enterprise in northern Viet-
Nam at this date. The most obvious kind of site one would expect to be present in north-
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ern Viet-Nam, if there were a sizable Chinese presence during this period, would be 
tumulus-covered subterranean tombs constructed in brick, such as exist for later periods 
of Chinese occupation in Viet-Nam and as exist for the Western Han period (i.e., the 
period in question) in China proper. But so far none has come to light and I seriously 
doubt very many, if any~ ever will. Objects found in PVN tombs from this period suggest 
a certain level of trade with the north, but most of the objects are oflocal manufacture, out 
oflocal materials, and in the local idiom. Whatever the Nan-Yiieh officials accomplished 
in the area at this time, it does not appear to have left any important material traces. 
Another point on which nearly all investigators have agreed is that the PVN nobles 
continued to rule in a more or less unobstructed fashion at this time, leading one to 
wonder what economic interchange was taking place and what changes, if changes there 
were, took place in the demographic situation. I pose these questions here and take them 
up again later on because I believe they are crucial to the understanding of the impact 
China first had on the Vietnamese. The basis for the relationship between the PVN (and 
later the Vietnamese) on one hand and the Chinese government(s) on the other through-
out the millennium which commences in the second century B.C. can be analyzed from 
the economic point of view in terms of the three T's: trade, tribute, and taxes. These three 
form a sort of continuum along which one can calculate fairly accurately the degree of 
Chinese control. During this first period of contact and encroachment, we witness the 
slow evolution of the relationship from one of a purely trading variety (probably by in-
termediaries at the outset, then more directly by Chinese merchants) to one of a tribute 
variety. It would be well to remember that the legates of Chao T'o to his new vassals in 
Chiao-chih and Chiu-chen were preceded by gifts, and I am skeptical of any idea that the 
state of Nan-Yiieh was in a position to enforce true taxation per se over a protracted 
period. What I believe was really taking place was a kind of enforced trade, verging on 
tribute. Nobles who wished to obtain certain Chinese goods, such as are found in small 
quantity in PVN tombs, probably had to see to it that the legates got some sort of in-
digenous goods in return, such as the pearls for which the region later became widely 
noted in China. Trade became tribute when the exchange became no longer discretionary, 
and I think the loss of discretion on the PVN side was not an overnight occurrence. 
As regards the demographic situation, I have really only one point to make. I stated 
earlier that the Red River delta appears from all evidence to have been well populated 
prior to Chinese encroachment, a fact drawn not only from the number of sites but from 
the size of early hydraulic works, from the dimensions of Co-loa as well as the sizable area 
across which related sites are found (one would expect greater dissimilarities between sites 
as far apart as Thanh-hoa and the northern Red River delta if the interstices were thinly 
populated). There is really very little to make one think that this situation was changed by 
the events of the second century B.C. I have alluded previously to the unhealthy climate to 
be found in southern China at this period, a circumstance which still obtained as late as 
the sixth century, when, according to the Dai Viet Su Ky Toan Thu (ngoai ky, q. 4, for the 
year A.D. 542), a Chinese army sent south to punish upstart Vietnamese rebels lost be-
tween 60 and 70 percent of its troops to malaria by the time it had reached Ho-p'uag in 
southern Kuang-tung Province and had to retreat without having engaged the enemy. 
Now this does not mean that Kuang-tung was an undifferentiated sanitary horror, as can 
be seen from the apparent prosperity of such places as P'an-yii and Ho-p'u, but only that, 
relative to the Red River delta area,· it was a much less desirable place to inhabit and far 
fewer people did so. And, though we have a great number of reports detailing the climatic 
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drawbacks of the South China area for the first eight centuries that the Chinese took up 
residence there, corresponding reports on northern Viet-Nam are curiously few. From 
Thai-nguyen to Thanh-hoa, the northern part ofViet-Nam is mostly open country with 
easy access from one place to another frequently provided by waterways, both natural and 
manmade. The Kuang-tung/Kuang-hsi region, although home to several powerful rivers, 
is much less easily traversed by premodern methods, laced as it is with defiles and what 
are still to this day some marvelously thick forests. How much more difficult it must have 
been two thousand years ago, particularly if the indigenous tribes were disinclined to 
cooperate! Malaria, which seems to have been a primary problem, tends to be more 
prevalent in the upland areas, to whose clear running streams the female Anopheles 
mosquito prefers to entrust the incubation of her young. These mountainous folds are 
precisely what separate one part of South China from another, and they discourage mov-
ing about unnecessarily. My contention is that the Chinese who made it as far as Nan-
Yiieh and settled there successfully did not have much encouragement to leave for the 
Red River delta (apart from political refugees who fled the repercussions of Chao T'o's 
original coup d'etat or later campaigns), having invested much effort to get as far as they 
did and having had the good luck to survive. Not only would it involve the hardships of 
yet another journey, it also meant living in a province where Chinese power was much 
less sure. There were most likely a few merchants for whom the prospect of new markets 
was a sufficient lure. To the average farmer, however, it was a much less attractive propo-
sition for the moment. Land for cultivation in the Red River delta was already in the 
hands of PVN farmers who were using techniques as productive as or more productive 
than the ones which Chinese farmers would have brought down with them. There was 
potentially less competition for land in places such as the plain of Canton, and the 
Chinese cultivator held a greater technical advantage over the indigenous Yiieh farmer, 
who may not have been as feckless as the Chinese depicted him but who, to judge from 
the little archaeological evidence in hand, was not on a par with the PVN. 
We know very little about specific individuals during this time. Local nobles continued 
in power, but we do not know who they were and no PVN names are recorded until the 
year III B.C. and the fall of the Nan-Yiieh kingdom. Actually, the fall of Nan-Yiieh was 
without much immediate effect inside Chiao-chih and Chiu-chen, although most modern 
historical surveys of Asia (Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig 1973:262, Dudley 1973:143, 
for example) use the date III B.C. as the point in time when Viet-Nam was integrated into 
the Chinese Empire. This was true only in a formalistic sense, since the armies of the Han 
never actually set foot on PVN territory during the course of their campaign. Emperor 
Wu-ti of the Han, seizing upon the occasion of turmoil at the Nan-Yiieh court, sent forth 
a several-pronged military expedition which was designed to converge upon P'an-yii. The 
armies, their ranks swollen by "criminals"ah (Ch'ien Han Shu: ch. 6), who may well have 
included peasants down on their luck, set out in the autumn of 112 B.C. and were quite 
successful within the year. P'an-yii fell in flames and the rest ofNan-Yiieh either rallied to 
the Han or acquiesced at sword point. By the time Lu Po-tea. (commander of the main 
force) reached Ho-p'u, word of what was going on had reached the Red River delta and 
the legates in Chiao-chih and Chiu-chen quickly found that their sympathies lay with the 
Han. They forwarded to Ho-p'u gifts of 100 head of cattle and 1000 measures of wine 
(items and numbers that sound suspiciously like a regular tribute payment) along with the 
census rolls. This was the act of prudent men; it obviated the need for Chinese troops to 
enter the region, which was probably a relief to both sides. Had Lu Po-te's army gone 
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ahead and taken the delta by force, it is not possible to say what the consequences would 
have been, even for the rallied legates. Although the legates have always been presumed to 
have been ethnic Chinese, I think that in the course of their duties and prolonged resi-
dence in Chiao-chih and Chiu-chen, they may have come to identify their own interests 
with those of the local nobility, with whom they could have had a symbiotic relationship. 
At best, their arrangements would have been interfered with or could have been replaced, 
or if greed got the best of the Han commanders, they could have lost their heads as well as 
their purses. 
It was the policy of the Han to bestow titles on rallied foreign enemies once their con-
trol was assured, and so one turns to chapter 20 of the Shih Chi to look at the list of those 
elevated to high honorary rank after the Nan-Yiieh campaign. Here we find some curious 
things. First, a certain Huang T'ungaj is raised to the rank of marquis in the spring of the 
year 110 B.C. It is said that he was a generalak in the army of the Ou-lo. Looking at the 
only other source one can find that mentions him, the Ch'ien Han Shu (ch. 17), we find 
that he had acquired the necessary merit for his elevation by cutting off the head of an in-
dividual called the King of Hsi_yiial (or Tay-vu Vuong in Vietnamese). What useful 
knowledge can we glean from this cursory summarization? To begin with, there was some 
sort of army in Chiao-chih at this time which Chinese historians designated the "Ou-lo" 
army. What kind of force it was is unstated, but it was apparently a force in being and in 
situ, not a constituent of the Han expeditionary army of 112 B.C. Its nominal loyalty 
would have been to Nan-Yiieh under the concept ofPVN vassalage, but it may in reality 
have been a militia with a largely local sphere of action and influence, a regiment at the 
disposal of the local nobility and/or the Nan-Yiieh legates. My own theory is that at the 
time of the Han takeover ofNan-Yiieh, this Ou-lo army played some role in the determi-
nation of the established powers in Chiao-chih (and Chiu-chen) to rally to the Han rather 
than to resist. Who was Huang T'ung? Judging from his name, he may have been an eth-
nic Chinese or part Chinese, but that is far from sure since the traditionally Chinese fami-
ly name Huang may only be a nom de guerre by which he was known to later historians in 
China. Who was his victim, the Hsi-yii King? Here we are on somewhat better ground, 
since at least we know from the Dai Viet Su Ky Toan Thu (ngoai ky, q. 3) that Hsi-yii was 
divided later into Feng-ch'iam (or Phong-khe in Vietnamese) and Wang-haian (or Vong-
hai), and the citadel of Co-loa is situated in Phong-khe. According to Maspero (1918:11, 
15-16), the King of Hsi-yii was a lord with a considerable domain; if this was so and ifhis 
seat of power was at Co-loa, the most imposing site in the Viet-Nam of this period and tra-
ditionally the residence of An-duong Vuong, then he may well have been very high among 
the PVN nobility, if not paramount. His execution could have nipped in the bud any 
PVN inclination to take advantage of the situation and revolt or, as Maspero (1918) sug-
gests, it could have been the result of a failed revolt. The reconstruction of such events is 
not mere idle conjecture inasmuch as the notation in the Chinese sources of the existence 
of an army in PVN territory, of the existence of the Hsi-yii King, and of the imposing of 
the will of the former on the latter implies very strongly that an autonomous monarchical 
tradition continued in Viet-Nam up to 111 B.C., and it acts independently to confirm the 
thesis that Nan-Yiieh had not taken firm control ofPVN territory previously. The impor-
tance attached by the Chinese to the elimination of the King ofHsi-yii, attested to by their 
honoring Huang T'ung for its accomplishment, reinforces my belief that the continued 
existence ofPVN kingship was more than theoretical in nature. 
Two other observations a propos of the Shih Chi's table of marquises are in order. Of 
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all the names listed of men who participated in the Han acquisition ofNan-Yiieh, the only 
name connected with thePVN area is that of Huang T'ung. This might signify either that 
official contact with the area on the part of the Han was still quite limited at the time of 
the composition of the Shih Chi (c. 90 B.C.) or that Huang T'ung was simply the most ob-
vious choice to be named marquis in the PVN territories. I think it was probably a com-
bination of these two factors, especially after comparing the circumstances with Han poli-
cy elsewhere. For instance, Hun (Hsiung-nuaO) kings are listed in the same table as having 
received similar titles to confirm their positions oflocal authority. It would be reasonable 
to suspect that Huang T'ung was likewise thought by the Chinese to be the most powerful 
individual in Chiao-chih at the time. But several Hun chieftains are mentioned, whereas 
only one person is mentioned for the PVN area. Since the PVN were a fairly numerous 
and concentrated population, one would have expected more names from their area if the 
Chinese were in continual contact with them, as was the case with the Huns. 
If the status quo ante bellum continued for a while in southern China and Chiao-chih 
and Chiu-chen, it becomes evident from a close reading of chapter 20 that the Han pro-
ceeded to do away with the legacy of the reconfirmed local lords. To wit, it is a most strik-
ing coincidence that every last one of the marquises created after the fall of Nan-Yiieh 
either died conveniently leaving no heirs, or else those unlucky men who bore their in-
heritance and succeeded to their ranks were soon put to death. It is obvious that what we 
are witnessing in the former Nan-Yiieh territories in the first century B.C. is not fortuitous 
happenstance but part of a deliberate policy of steadily tightened Han control which re-
quires the eventual elimination of hereditary satraps and the substitution ofloyal Chinese 
officials. I emphasize steady rather than immediate if for no other reason than because the 
total suppression of local authorities would have necessitated the stationing of a sizable 
military force in Nan-Yiieh over a period of time and at an expense greater than was prob-
ably feasible for the Han, who had other problems to deal with of a more pressing sort up 
north. At some point, this policy of tightened control began to make itself felt in Chiao-
chih and Chiu-chen. I have yet to turn up any truly informative passages relative to the 
PVN in the standard Chinese sources for the period between 111 B.C. and the end of the 
following century, but it only makes sense to suppose that some increase in Chinese ac-
tivity was taking place. 
While the years between the events of 111 and the end of the first century B.C. may be 
among the most poorly documented in all Vietnamese history, from the archaeological as 
well as from the philological point of view, and while we cannot create nor seldom discov-
er "new" first-century texts, we can still persist in digging in the literal rather than the 
figurative sense. J anse (1947, v. 1 :xvi) says that archaeological evidence implies trade and 
perhaps settlers in the PVN area from China proper at or before this time but that only in 
the first century A.D. is there evidence for such settlers becoming important, and I think 
this surmise will be largely borne out by future finds. Some focusing of archaeological at-
tention on this century would nonetheless be very useful. I am referring to the earliest 
location(s) for the seat of Han power in Chiao-chih. The Dai Viet Su Ky Toan Thu (ngoai 
ky, q. 3) would have us believe that a Chinese official named Shih Taiap (the Vietnamese 
call him Thach Dai) was sent south to govern Nan-Yiieh from Chiao-chih and that he set 
up shop at Long-uyenaq, better known as Long-bienar• The Hou Han Shu (ch. 33) gives 
the site of the original administrative center as Lei(?)-lou" (Vietnamese Luy-Iau), which 
Madrole (1937:267fi) identified with the village of Lung-khea " a location agreed upon by 
the Kham Dinh Viet Su Thong Giam Cuong Mucau (q. 2, a nineteenth-century compen-
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dium usually thought to be well informed though, in this instance, admittedly somewhat 
too late in composition to have the weight of an original source) as well as a number of 
modern scholars like Tran Van Giap (1932:209). I entertain some doubts about the advis-
ability of accepting any of the assertions at face value. For one thing, I hesitate to believe 
that the Chinese confirmed the old Nan-Yiieh legates in their positions (with the august 
title of t'ai shouav) and then appointed a single governor in their place the very next year; 
the difficulty is as much logistical as political. As I have outlined earlier, the real power 
seems to have lain in the hands of Huang T'ung at this time, and we know of his elevation 
to marquis in April of the same year as Shih Tai's supposed appointment. The Kham 
Dinh Viet Su Thong Giam Cuong Muc confuses the issue somewhat further by stating that 
Shih Tai was sent as governor of Chiao-chih only and that older histories were mistaken. 
If the Hou Han Shu or the Dai Viet Su Ky Toan Thu is correct in placing the Han capital 
for the whole of former Nan-Yiieh in PVN territory (be it Luy-Iau or Long-bien), then I 
can only suppose that the Chinese were motivated by an odd sense of logic or by factors 
quite hidden from us today. Neither of these places makes any strategic sense for the gov-
erning of Nan-Yiieh, whose former capital and the preponderance of whose ethnic Chi-
nese population were much farther to the northeast at P'an-yii. In fact, the Hou Han Shu 
goes on to say that the administrative seat was moved northeastward to Kuang-hsinaw (in 
Ts'ang-wu=, about 100 miles up river from P'an-yii) some four years later. The texts are 
plainly too contradictory to lead us very far. It would therefore be useful to have some 
firmer idea of the physical age of such sites as Luy-Iau and especially of any clearly iden-
tifiable Chinese artifacts that might be found there. Ultimately, one would like to be able 
to say something about the growth of possible early urban centers like Luy-Iau and to tell 
whether the presence of Han administrative officials and their retinue was a primary im-
petus or whether urban genesis was a process already underway as a result of factors in-
herent in PVN society, only to be encouraged by the Chinese arrival on the scene. 
If PVN society was already well enough developed to have manifested occupational 
specialization, social classes, private accumulations of wealth, regional waterworks, and so 
forth, I cannot help but conclude that the Chinese arrived after town centers arose and 
that they simply chose preexisting centers from which to operate, stimulating growth 
through increased commerce. If this is not heresy enough, I would go even further and say 
that, at least for a while following the full installation of Chinese hegemony after A.D. 43, 
Chinese rule and their establishment of plantations may have actually acted to slow down, 
ifnot curtail entirely, the growth of true urban centers (as opposed to simple market sites) 
in Chiao-chih and Chiu-chen. 
Whether Shih Tai came to rule in 110 or somewhat later, whether Huang T'ung held 
military power behind the civil authority of the former Nan-Yiieh legates reconfirmed by 
the Han as t'ai shou of Chiao-chih and Chiu-chen, or whether some other sequence of 
events took place, events permanently hidden from modern view, the process of in ere as-
ing Chinese control slowly took hold. Previously, during the Nan-Yiieh period, economic 
activity that once could have been qualified as "trade" seems to have become ritualized to 
the extent that it began to pass for "tribute." Historically, the most important fact of 
PVN economic life in the first century B.C. was that this tribute evolved into taxes. Exact-
ly who was taxed and how, I cannot say, but the Chinese at first were obviously in a better 
position to tax their own kind than tax the semiautonomous PVN, still beholden to the in-
digenous nobility (called by the Chinese the Loay lords). I would thus venture to suggest 
that Han taxes per se fell first on ethnic Chinese traders who began to operate more freely 
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and widely and then on whoever trickled into the Red River region in the way of Chinese 
agricultural settlers, though I still insist that this latter category was of limited numbers 
and, for the moment, the archaeological findings do not contradict me in this regard. 
There came a time, nonetheless, when the Han administration was bound to extend taxa-
tion to the original inhabitants of Chiao-chih and Chiu-chen. I think this was accom-
plished via the procedure of gradually converting a group assessment on the PVN, accom-
panied by Chinese tokens of ritual reciprocity, over to an assessment based on an estimate 
of the wealth of the constituent PVN clans or even individual families within the PVN 
group, an assessment with few reciprocal measures or none at all. This kind of taxation re-
quires some means of enforcement and enforcement surely breeds resentment. 
Taxation also means tax rolls and, in the Chinese case, a census. Such a census took 
place in A.D. 2 and its results are most instructive. The details of the great accounting are 
to be found in the Ch'ien Han Shu (ch. 28), but they have been cogently treated for the 
benefit of the nonspecialist by Bielenstein (1948); my brief comments will refer mainly to 
his analysis. Of relevance to our inquiry are not only the absolute numbers for population 
in the PVN areas but also the relative size of the PVN population when compared to other 
parts of the Han empire. A glance at Bielenstein's plate II illustrating population distribu-
tion and density in A.D. 2 tells much of the story: The Red River delta was the most dense-
ly populated area in the Empire south of the Yangtse. Only in Sze-chuan and in the North 
China plain did population densities equal that of the PVN heartland. The total popula-
tion for the PVN territories in the Han documentation is given as 981,735 individuals in 
143,643 households. This population figure is practically twice that of all the rest of the 
former Nan-Yiieh territory combined. All of which, I believe, bears out my contention 
that where the PVN lived was far and away more productive a region than the area that 
was later to become Kuang-tung/Kuang-hsi. PVN farming and irrigation techniques had 
to have been already relatively well developed in order to support such a dense popula-
tion. Since it is only in the annals for the decades subsequent to the great census that one 
reads Chinese statements to the effect that they taught the PVN how to farm, even if ar-
chaeological evidence for advanced PVN agricultural techniques were lacking, which it is 
not, one would be obliged to treat such Chinese assertions with the greatest reserve. 
A curious feature of the census is what it tells us about the size of the households in-
volved (Bielenstein 1948: pI. VIII). While the average for all China is 4.7 members per 
household (something which tells the acute observer that we are dealing with a real census 
and not just tax rolls), the PVN figure is closer to 8, the highest figure in the Empire but 
approached by the figures in other areas with heavy non-Chinese populations, such as 
Yiin-nan and Korea. The difference in the pattern of household size, especially between 
that of Chiao-chih and the rest of China, can be adequately accounted for, I think, by the 
fact that in the Red River delta we are dealing with an almost entirely non-Chinese ethnic 
group whose culture may well have included a greater degree of communal living (cf. 
houses illustrated on Dong-son bronzes in Bezacier 1972:201). All in all, then, the census 
of A.D. 2 provides interesting and independent information which tends to confirm several 
aspects of work in other texts as well as the findings of archaeological investigations to 
date. 
However ill-informed they may have been about the PVN at earlier times, and however 
much that has misled scholars since, it is evident that, by the beginning of the first cen-
tury A.D., the Chinese were not only much better and more accurately versed in general, 
they were in a position to profit from their knowledge. Better communications led to 
regular intercourse, and this in turn began to make larger-scale Chinese immigration a 
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more feasible proposition. While I do not believe that the southward deportations of the 
Ch'in resulted in a significant rise in the numbers of Chinese residents in the Red River 
delta and Thanh-hoa, as convenient as this explanation may have been for earlier writers, 
I believe that Chinese settlers came later on, repelled by conditions in China as much as 
attracted by the potential wealth of the delta region. Peasants do not as a rule migrate so 
much to find the good life as to flee the bad. And they do not seek pearls, rhinoceros horn, 
and kingfisher feathers, they seek land. At the beginning of the first century A.D., who 
came to Viet-Nam and what did they fmd? 
If Han China of the early and mid-second century B.C. was something of a golden age 
for the national economy, giving large sections of the Chinese farming populace a respite 
from the interminable cycle of hunger and debt, it also resulted in the amassing of large 
caches of private wealth in merchant hands, and the wealth thus accumulated eventually 
found its way into land investments. As the taxation structure began to weigh more and 
more on the peasants and levies of one kind or another to finance imperial expansion (e.g., 
the expedition to Nan-Yiieh) grew heavier, the rate of tenancy rose. The stability of a 
largely freeholding peasantry was replaced by the precarious economic sensitivity of a 
class of renters who paid a dozen times over in rent what they had once paid in taxes. Of-
ficials with access to distressed fields became landlords as often as did the merchants, giv-
ing rise to a kind of de facto mixed gentry with a pivotal position of control over money 
and land at the local level and little interest in changing things, so there was often 
nowhere for the impoverished peasant to turn. In the middle of the first century B.C., 
Confucian scholars in government at the higher level made valiant efforts at economic 
reform, but the rot had set in too deeply to be exorcised from the court. A mark of the 
times was the increased rate of peasants, particularly women and children, being sold into 
bondage. It is thus possible that by this time the impetus had become great enough and 
that farmers had begun to move south, but it was really the events of the period A.D. 8-23, 
including attempts to remedy the situation, that set in motion the significant wave of 
Chinese migration to the PVN territories, an influx of people not shown in the census of 
the previous decade. 
Usurpations are changes in control of dynasties from within the court which ultimately 
do not last-when they do last, they are simply not called usurpations. In A.D., 8, Wang 
Manga• "usurped" the Han throne, after already having controlled it for a number of 
years from behind, and set about trying to stabilize the imperial economy. One objective 
of his measures was to reduce tenancy by limiting holdings and forcing divestiture on the 
part of powerful members of the entrenched gentry. One can imagine with what relish 
they received this fiat. Added to this was the natural opposition of all those clans and fac-
tions who had lost influence through Wang Mang's accession in the first place. And the 
result was civil strife, including six open revolts even before Wang Mang's official en-
thronement. If this were not enough, in the year A.D. 11, the Yellow River suddenly 
changed course and the entire mouth of this great waterway, central to all transport and ir-
rigation in North China, shifted from north to south of the Shan-tung Peninsula. This 
event not only created catastrophic flooding and loss of life but, in an era given to over-
weening superstition and prophecy from natural occurrences, it was taken as a sure sign 
by those who wished to revolt anyway. The Red Eyebrow rebellion broke out accompa-
nied by widespread banditry. 
At this point, the flight south is documented. The governor of the former Nan-Yiieh re-
gion, now designated as Chiao-chouba, one Teng Jangbb, sealed off the borders to his 
southern lands and remained loyal to the house of Han. Whether at the instigation of his 
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sup'erior or out of natural inclination, the t'ai shou of Chiao-chih, since the beginning of 
the century a man named Hsi Kuangbc, opened his arms to welcome those fleeing from 
the north. We know of the arrival of many well-to-do Chinese, of scholars and the like not 
in sympathy with Wang Mang. What we do not know is the extent to which poorer Chi-
nese also made the journey south. But apparently those who came for the most part 
stayed, because later men of note in Vietnamese history have claimed descent from these 
early refugees. If our knowledge of later history can be any guide, the ranks of these 
Chinese newcomers, particularly among the peasants, tended to be mainly adult males. 
Not only were women and children more likely to have ended up in bondage back north, 
but Chinese society at this period afforded men greater psychological freedom of move-
ment. Once in a new land, they could take a local wife (sometimes several) and their off-
spring would still, by their lights, be Chinese, a form of sinicization and broadening of 
Chinese influence not to be discouraged by the government. 
As we know from the census figures of A.D. 2, the population density in the Red River 
region was particularly high. The new arrivals were, therefore, in competition for space 
and arable land. While previous newcomers, fewer in number and strung out over a 
longer period, could probably have been absorbed by the ploughing of new land and the 
adaptation of local technology, a gradual approach, this latest group all coming at once 
must have proven highly disruptive. I think it is in the process of their attempted integra-
tion into the PVN context that we find the root cause of the next great event in Vietnam-
ese history, the revolt of the sisters Trung. 
The Trung sisters (by name Trung Tracbd and Trung Nhibe) and their revolt against 
Chinese rule in the year A.D. 40 have been the subject of the attentions of many scholars, 
particularly in Viet-Nam itself. Their status as genuine national heroines has meant that 
their hagiographies playa prominent role in the pages of Vietnamese schoolbooks, and no 
major city in Viet-Nam is without a main thoroughfare bearing their name. The most 
complete discussion of their revolt and its antecedents available in a Western language is 
that by Henri Maspero (1918), which is still used as a standard reference. The best study I 
know of in Vietnamese is by Duy Hinh (1965) although the Trung sisters are dealt with at 
some length, and rarely with any originality, in most every history of Viet-Nam to be 
found in any language. I shall, therefore, refrain from going into long discussion of the 
revolt itself and stick to an analysis of the reasons for its outbreak since they are most ger-
mane to an understanding ofPVN society in its final stages, before the imposition of com-
plete Chinese control which took place once the rebellion was quelled. Many of the rea-
sons for the uprising have been agreed upon by scholars; they can be summed up as, first, 
a rejection of forced sinicization and, second, a reaction on the part of the PVN nobility 
against their ever-increasing loss of political power and prestige. These were certainly im-
portant factors, but they have not been correctly understood as yet because, since they 
seem to go pretty far in explaining the revolt, no one has ever bothered to examine what 
lies beneath them. Duy Hinh comes close when he notes that: 
The feudalist Han landlord clique immediately relied upon the political power of the 
Western Han to grab away the ricelands and the labor force in order to carry out eco-
nomic enterprises according to the feudal manner of production. (1965:5) 
Unfortunately, Duy Hinh never pursues this line of thinking quite far enough, paying 
primary attention to the labor aspects and seeing much of the bone of contention between 
the Chinese and the PVN lords as one of who finally got to control the "slave" elements 
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in the work force. Maspero (1918: 12-13) speaks of a" ... sorte de malaise general" which 
was due to the Chinese efforts to install a regular administration and to the loss of authori-
ty by the PVN nobility. As for Trung Trac herself(her sister seems to have played a much 
lesser role), Maspero rather patronizingly characterizes her as a woman whose" ... carac-
tere violent et altier se pliait mal aux restrictions que la politique chinoise s'effon;ait d'im-
poser." The direct cause of her revolt was that she was " ... probablement humiliee par 
quelques observations ou quelque acte du prefet," which sounds like something out of a 
novel about French provincialli(e in the nineteenth century. I submit that it is not possi-
ble in the current state of our knowledge about the period to make any valid judgments 
about the character of Trung Trac and those who surrounded her, much less attach any 
such judgments to reasons for their revolt. It is possible, however, and, I believe, 
necessary for a better understanding of PVN society at this time to look at what has been 
said about forced sinicization and interpret those statements in the light of what we know 
about the period from the various archaeological and philological data I touched upon 
previously. 
It has been asserted that PVN society was very possibly matrilineal (e.g., Le 1955:73, 
apud Przyluski), and I am of a similar opinion. Though one cannot be certain about it, we 
do know that matrilineality is not uncommon in the Pacific area and theories which hold 
that the predecessors of today's Pacific societies once lived in eastern Southeast Asia are 
now reasonably well accepted. But, even without such comparative evidence, the role of 
women in Vietnamese society since the nation's emancipation from Chinese rule in the 
tenth century, in spite of intensive Confucianization, demonstrates that they did not find 
themselves in such a lowly position as that of their Chinese sisters, even from a legal 
standpoint. The right of Vietnamese women to share in family inheritances, found in the 
Le code (Huard and Durand 1954:50), is surely a holdover from times long past, a de jure 
recognition of a de facto situation among the Vietnamese peasantry, many of whose 
village customs such as lacquering teeth and chewing betel we know can be traced to pre-
Chinese times. When large numbers of Chinese men came as immigrants to Chiao-chih 
and Chiu-chen in the first century A.D., I think they were looking for land. Marriage to 
local women, long a standard Chinese practice in frontier areas like Nan-Yiieh and still 
common today among Chinese in Southeast Asia, did not, however, procure for them the 
land they were seeking. This was because in a matrilineal society their wives' lands passed 
to their wives' female relatives. Even if PVN society was bilineal rather than exclusively 
matrilineal, the land would still have stayed largely in the wives' families in order to avoid 
losing it to the outsiders, who would then not respect local custom regarding its further 
disposition. Plainly stated, the patrilineal, nay, patriarchal, Chinese were denied legal ac-
cess to the real estate. I should not be surprised if there existed no general provisions for 
land sales either, particularly if the PVN nobles (who seem to have received their general 
appeilation 10 chiangbf, from their connection with the fields over which they had domin-
ion, i.e., 10 tienbg) were the de jure proprietors of all the rice lands which their subjects 
were allowed to till but not to transfer. 
It is evident that in such a situation, in order for the Chinese to make a legal claim on 
the land, the marriage laws or customs among the PVN would have to be changed over to 
conform with Chinese practice and aims. When we look at what the Chinese sources say 
they did to introduce the Chinese idea of civilization into Chiao-chih and Chiu-chen, we 
find that they indeed obliged the PVN to conform to Chinese marriage rites (T'ung Tien: 
ch. 188, Maspero 1918: 12). This was a measure attributed directly to Hsi Kuang, the 
same man who welcomed the refugees from the north, who is also said to have "trans-
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formed the people by rites and justice" (Hou Han Shu: ch. 106, whence its repetition in 
most Vietnamese sources, e.g., Dai Viet Su Ky Toan Thu: q. 3). Both "rites" and 
"justice" can be interpreted in this context in terms of requiring the PVN to conform to 
proper Chinese notions of the natural order of things, such as patrilineality and exclusive 
male inheritance. 
Just exactly what sequence of events took place prior to the Trung Sisters' rebellion is 
not reported. Without rehearsing in detail a story readily available to the interested reader 
in the sources I have mentioned, I will outline the important points as follows: Trung 
Trac was the daughter of a noble PVN family and her father was lord of the county of Me-
linhbh • She was married to a man named Thi Sachbi, son of the lord ofChu-dienbj County. 
A successor to Hsi Kuang came to Chiao-chih in the person of Su Tingbk who, according 
to the Dai Viet Su Ky Toan Thu, was a cruel and avaricious individual of the first order. 
The Hou Han Shu (ch. 54) and the Dai Viet Su Ky Toan Thu are in accord with what hap-
pened between Su Ting and Trung Trac to begin with: "Su Ting used the laws with 
which to entangle her. "bl The Vietnamese sources go on to say that Su Ting also killed 
Trung Trac's husband and, thus angered, she revolted. For the Chinese sources, this lat-
ter detail is missing, and it is Trung Trac's problem with the law that causes her to revolt 
and lead her still very much alive husband, Thi Sach, along with her (cf. Chiao-chou Wai-
yii Chi, apud Shui Ching Chu, ch. 37). And here we are at the crux of the matter. The 
patriarchal Confucian precepts adhered to by the authors of the Vietnamese sources did 
not permit them to accept the fact that a woman could lead a national revolt while her hus-
band was still drawing breath. It must have been that Su Ting killed Trung Trac's hus-
band; how else could she have led the revolt? What could the law have to do with a mere 
woman? Why would men have followed her? In writing down the history of their country 
for a period prior to the instilling of the Confucian values which they themselves now 
shared more than a millennium later, Vietnamese scholars could not conceive of the fact 
that the society of their distant ancestors allowed such a prominent place to women, and 
so they rewrote history to follow what must have been the glorious truth (a practice which 
has yet to die out completely). The Chinese felt no such compunctions about describing 
the happenings in what was to them a society of barbarians which gave high honor to 
women. Chinese historians no doubt felt that the story of Trung Trac simply illustrated 
the pitiful state in which the poor PVN found themselves before they received the full 
benefits of Chinese enlightenment. 
Trung Trac's entanglements with Chinese law, I believe, had something to do with her 
rights as a noblewoman over the lands within her family's domain, possibly with her 
rights to succeed to control of them once her parents died. Her alliance with Thi Sach 
would have united control in one couple over a considerable territory right in the heart of 
the most heavily populated and probably the most fertile region of Chiao-chih. If it was 
the aim of the Han governor to gain control over land to satisfy the needs of his ever-
increasing Chinese constituency, especially the mandarin families who fled the peasant 
revolts and restrictions of Wang Mang up north and who must have been among his main 
supporters, then using Chinese law to strip Trung Trac of her lands in Me-linh would 
have served two purposes admirably. Su Ting could at one stroke break up a potentially 
troublesome concentration of indigenous power and also acquire control over lands which 
could be distributed to members of his own faction or to restive Chinese farmers. 
That Trung Trac was recognized as a legitimate leader is amply attested to by the suc-
cess of her revolt. One might be tempted to suppose that the presence of her sister in 
stories of the war could be taken as further proof both of her position as heir to the Me-
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linh estates (no brothers are ever mentioned) and of the general importance of women. 
Together, she and her sister, at the head of an army that drew the broadest support of the 
nobility and of the peasants who filled the ranks, swept the Chinese military from the face 
of the land in rapid order. Su Ting fled north to Nan-haibm • One can only imagine what 
fate awaited the Chinese residents who were left behind. Once in control of the coun-
tryside, Trung Trac was declared queen. 
The story ofViet-Nam as the Chinese found it ends soon thereafter with the suppres-
sion of the short-lived reign of the heroine queen. For when the Chinese were finally able 
to put together an invasion force two years later under the capable and accomplished Ma 
Yuanb., he descended upon the nation with determination and ruthlessness and 20,000 
men under arms. The campaign was not an easy one and it took two years to come to the 
end of it, since PVN resistance still continued after the deaths of Trac and her younger 
sister and the Chinese were still not used to fighting in the tropics. Ma Yuan's final vic-
tory spelled the end for the power of the indigenous higher nobility. Sinicization and 
direct Chinese rule were imposed with the backing of a sufficient military presence to en-
sure respect for Han law. It is interesting to see that one ofMa Yuan's first measures dur-
ing the short period that he acted as a sort of military consul, after having attended to 
defensive works such as the building of ramparts in all prefectural and subprefectural 
towns, was the revision of local law, which was made to conform to that in general force 
throughout the Empire, sometimes referred to as the "ten points" of law (Hou Han Shu: 
ch. 54). The legal basis for the economic as well as the politico-military domination of the 
country by the Chinese was now laid and, with periods of greater and lesser severity, it 
was to last a millennium. 
I should only like to say one thing in conclusion. My reconstruction of the events of the 
300-year period just under discussion is, of course, provisional, though I feel reasonably 
sure that further work will strengthen my theories rather than enfeeble them. I work en-
tirely from textual sources and have tried to make sense of them now that I have in hand 
some of the published results of archaeological findings. I Nearly all of the conclusions I 
have reached depend upon those findings; they contribute to my interpretation of the 
texts in such a way and to such a degree that, without them, I could not have brought 
myself to make any new points about PVN society. This is not to say that philological 
work on the period is at a dead end and that one cannot go further with what already exists 
in the libraries, piecing together bits of evidence here and there. It is rather to say that, 
given the limits of time and resources to which all scholars are heir, it is far more produc-
tive to maintain a dialogue between the disciplines. This is a two-way road. Archaeolo-
gists are always potentially capable of digging up some object that blows all our pretty 
theories sky high, but, at the same time, when dealing with periods that bridge history 
and prehistory such as the one discussed here, it is occasionally helpful to know what is 
said in the odd text we have lying about. Sometimes an old poem can tell you where 
to dig. 
NOTE 
1 In early 1978, when this piece was completed, I had not yet had the benefit of reading the most interesting 
work Dr. Keith Taylor did at Ann Arbor for his 1976 Ph.D. dissertation, entitled "The Birth of Vietnam: Sino-
Vietnamese Relations to the Tenth Century and the Origins of Vietnamese Nationhood." I should also note the 
excellent 1980 publication by Dr. Jennifer Holmgren, Chinese Colonisation of Northern Vietnam (Canberra: 
Australian National University Press), which will be of interest to the reader in connection with the develop-
ment of Vietnamese society following the expedition of Ma Yuan. 
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